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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Finally, People v. Rogers held that once the "indelible right" to
counsel has attached, statements elicited from a defendant on an
unrelated charge require suppression if made in the absence of an
attorney.
The Survey also comments upon several lower court decisions
of special significance to the practitioner. In Laffey v. City of New
York, the Appellate Division, First Department, held that dismis-
sal for failure to answer a calendar call constituted "neglect to
prosecute," barring recommencement of the action under CPLR
205(a). In the rapidly changing area of professional advertising, the
Appellate Division, Second Department, circumscribed the use of
advertising of legal services by mail in In re Koffler. The Koffier
Court chose not to penalize the defendant attorneys, but admon-
ished the Bar that any future violations would result in the impo-
sition of disciplinary sanctions.
It is hoped that these and other cases examined in The Survey
will serve to further the goal of informing the practitioner of note-
worthy trends in New York practice.
ARTICLE 2-LIMITATIONS OF TiME
CPLR 205(a): Prior dismissal for failure to answer calendar call
held to be termination of action for neglect to prosecute
CPLR 205(a) generally provides that a timely commenced ac-
tion may be recommenced within six months of the date of its dis-
missal, despite the expiration of the original statute of limitations.1
This extension is unavailable, however, where the prior action is
terminated for neglect to prosecute. 2 The phrase "neglect to prose-
CPLR 205(a) (Supp. 1979-1980) provides:
(a) New action by plaintiff. If an action is timely commenced and is terminated
in any other manner than by a voluntary discontinuance, a dismissal of the com-
plaint for neglect to prosecute the action, or a final judgment upon the merits, the
plaintiff, or, if he dies, and the cause of action survives, his executor or adminis-
trator, may commence a new action upon the same transaction or occurrence or
series of transactions or occurrences within six months after the termination pro-
vided that the new action would have been timely commenced at the time of com-
mencement of the prior action.
2 CPLR 205(a) (Supp. 1979-1980); see, e.g., Flans v. Federal Ins. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 881,
374 N.E.2d 365, 403 N.Y.S.2d 466 (1978), rev'g, 56 App. Div. 2d 615, 391 N.Y.S.2d 659 (2d
Dep't 1977); Jelinek v. City of New York, 25 App. Div. 2d 425, 266 N.Y.S.2d 766 (1st Dep't
1966); Hymowitz v. Soprinsky, 24 App. Div. 2d 750, 263 N.Y.S.2d 822 (1st Dep't 1965);
Wright v. L.C. Defelice & Son, Inc., 22 App. Div. 2d 962, 256 N.Y.S.2d 63 (2d Dep't 1964),
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cute" has been construed as encompassing formal dismissals for
want of prosecution, abandonment, and failure to comply with a
demand for a complaint;3 it remains unclear, however, what lesser
levels of neglect which result in the dismissal of an action would
render unavailable the 205(a) extension.4 Recently, the Appellate
aff'd, 17 N.Y.2d 586, 215 N.E.2d 522, 268 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1966); notes 3 & 4 infra.
Exceptions to the availability of the 6 month extension other than dismissal for neglect
to prosecute exist where the prior dismissal is based on a judgment on the merits, see, e.g.,
Sauerbier v. Erie R.R., 195 Misc. 880, 90 N.Y.S.2d 43 (Sup. Ct. Steuben County 1949), or a
voluntary discontinuance. See, e.g., George v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 170, 390 N.E.2d
1156, 417 N.Y.S.2d 231 (1979), discussed in The Survey, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 137, 146
(1979); Friedman v. Long Island R.R., 273 App. Div. 786, 75 N.Y.S.2d 466 (2d Dep't 1947),
aff'd, 298 N.Y. 702, 82 N.E.2d 791 (1948).
3 CPLR 3216 provides the formal statutory framework for dismissals for want of prose-
cution. Such dismissals clearly constitute a neglect to prosecute within the meaning of
CPLR 205(a). See, e.g., Williams v. New York Life Ins. Co., 11 Misc. 2d 823, 174 N.Y.S.2d
392 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1958); see CPLR 205, commentary at 197 (McKinney 1972);
CPLR 3216, commentary at 917 (McKinney 1970); 1 WK&M 205.06 at 2-141 (1977). For
an in depth discussion of CPLR 3216 see SIEGEL § 375. CPLR 3404 provides for the dismis-
sal of abandoned cases marked off the calendar and not restored within 1 year. Dismissals
under this section also amount to termination for neglect to prosecute. See, e.g., Pomerantz
v. Cave, 10 App. Div. 2d 569, 195 N.Y.S.2d 437 (1st Dep't), appeal dismissed, 8 N.Y.2d 914,
168 N.E.2d 832, 204 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1960); FOURTH REP. at 200; see CPLR 3404, commentary
at 38 (McKinney 1963). Contra Austrian v. Red Arrow Bonded Messenger Corp., 16 Misc.
2d 1082, 184 N.Y.S.2d 92 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1959). Dismissals under CPLR 3012(b)
for failure to comply with a demand for a complaint similarly are considered to be dismis-
sals for neglect to prosecute. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Luks, 46 App. Div. 2d 634, 359 N.Y.S.2d
899 (1st Dep't 1974); Wright v. Farlin, 42 App. Div. 2d 141, 346 N.Y.S.2d 11 (3d Dep't),
appeal dismissed, 33 N.Y.2d 657, 303 N.E.2d 705, 348 N.Y.S.2d 980 (1973). But see Virgilio
v. Ketchum, 54 Misc. 2d 111, 113, 281 N.Y.S.2d 376, 378 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1967)
(failure to comply with demand for complaint not neglect to prosecute where "no pattern of
dilatoriness" existed). As noted by several commentators, the Virgilio plaintiff need not
have sought the CPLR 205(a) extension since the original statute of limitations had not run
and, therefore, an extension was unnecessary. CPLR 205, commentary at 198 (McKinney
1972); The Quarterly Survey, 42 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 436, 441 (1968); see Abbatemarco v.
Town of Brookhaven, 26 App. Div. 2d 664, 272 N.Y.S.2d 450 (2d Dep't 1966).
' Failure to select a jury has been held to constitute neglect to prosecute. Jelinek v.
City of New York, 25 App. Div. 2d 425, 266 N.Y.S.2d 766 (1st Dep't 1966); cf. Schuman v.
Hertz Corp., 23 App. Div. 2d 646, 257 N.Y.S.2d 400 (1st Dep't 1965) (dismissal for failure to
select jury held neglect to prosecute), rev'd, 17 N.Y.2d 604, 605, 215 N.E.2d 683, 684, 268
N.Y.S.2d 563, 563-64 (1966) (reversed on a finding of contrary intent of the trial judge). But
see Schneck v. S.T. Grand, Inc., 11 Misc. 2d 923, 174 N.Y.S.2d 749 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1958). The mere failure to answer a calendar call generally has not been deemed neglect to
prosecute. See Harris v. Harris, 246 App. Div. 667, 283 N.Y.S. 410 (3d Dep't 1935) (per
curiam); Sweeting v. Staten Island Midland Ry., 176 App. Div. 494, 162 N.Y.S. 961 (2d
Dep't 1917) (per curiam); Cordova v. City of New York, 57 Misc. 2d 823, 293 N.Y.S.2d 673
(Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1968); Stein v. Goldberg, 27 Misc. 2d 940, 213 N.Y.S.2d 847 (Sup.
Ct. Queens County 1961); Haber v. Telson, 2 Misc. 2d 118, 154 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 4 App. Div. 2d 677, 163 N.Y.S.2d 503 (2d Dep't 1957),
aff'd, 4 N.Y.2d 687, 148 N.E.2d 300, 171 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1958). Conversely, where the failure to
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Division, First Department, in Laffey v. City of New York, 5 held
that a dismissal of failure to answer a calendar call despite previ-
ous warnings that adjournments would not be allowed constituted
dismissal for neglect to prosecute and hence barred a new action.
In Laffey, the plaintiff instituted a negligence action against
the defendant in 1970. On the day the case was set down for trial,
both parties were admonished in conference that requests for ad-
journment due to the unavailability of counsel or witnesses would
be denied.' On the date of trial, the plaintiff failed to answer the
calendar call and the defendant's motion to dismiss was granted.'
One-half-hour later the plaintiff's counsel arrived. Although the
plaintiff's attorney stated that he was ready to go to trial, he con-
ceded that he could not "actually proceed to trial" because he had
no witnesses.8 The court consequently dismissed the complaint
notwithstanding counsel's objection that such a disposition would
foreclose the plaintiff's claim because the statute of limitationshad
expired.9 Eight days later the plaintiff reinstituted the action in-
voking the 6-month extension of CPLR 205(a). 10 Five years later
the defendant's motion to dismiss based on the statute of limita-
tions was denied by the Supreme Court, New York County and the
defendant appealed."'
In a memorandum decision from which Justice Fein dis-
sented,'2 the Appellate Division, First Department reversed, hold-
ing that the prior dismissal was for "neglect to prosecute."' 3 Jus-
appear is inexcusable or part of a general pattern of delay, the courts have refused to grant
the extention. See Flans v. Federal Ins. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 881, 374 N.E.2d 365, 403 N.Y.S.2d
466 (1978), rev'g, 56 App. Div. 2d 615, 391 N.Y.S.2d 659 (2d Dep't 1977); Hymowitz v.
Soprinsky, 24 App. Div. 2d 750, 263 N.Y.S.2d 822 (lst Dep't 1965); Wright v. L.C. Defelice
& Son, Inc., 22 App. Div. 2d 962, 256 N.Y.S.2d 63 (2d Dep't 1964), aff'd, 17 N.Y.2d 586, 215
N.E.2d 522, 268 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1966); note 20 infra.
5 72 App. Div. 2d 685, 421 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1st Dep't 1979).
6 Id.
7Id.
8 Id. Plaintiff's counsel stated that his client had not respondid to his letter informing
her of the date of trial. Id.
Id. The statute of limitations for an action against the state or one of its subdivisions
is 1 year and 90 days. GML § 50-i (McKinney 1977).
10 72 App. Div. 2d at 685, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 350-51.
1 Id. at 685, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 350.
12 The majority consisted of Presiding Justice Murphy and Justices Birns, Bloom, and
Silverman.
13 72 App. Div. 2d at 685, 421 N.Y.S. at 351 (citing Wright v. L.C. Defelice & Son, Inc.,
22 App. Div. 2d 962, 256 N.Y.S.2d 63 (2d Dep't 1964), afl'd, 17 N.Y.2d 586, 215 N.E.2d 522,
268 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1966)).
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tice Fein, in contrast, concluded that the majority decision could
not be supported by the record.14 The precedent relied upon by the
majority, Justice Fein noted, had involved dismissals for conduct
more repetitious and deliberate than that of the plaintiff. 5 More-
over, the order dismissing the plaintiff's action had given no indi-
cation of an intent to prejudice the institution of a new suit.'0
Prior to Laffey, courts generally have required an element of
deliberateness, which typically has been evinced by a pattern of
repeated delay by the plaintiff, for conduct to be deemed a neglect
to prosecute. 17 It is submitted, therefore, that the Laffey decision
should not be interpreted as creating an absolute rule that pre-
cludes the invocation of the liberal saving provisions of 205(a) for a
failure to answer a single calendar call."8 Rather, it appears that
more than the plaintiff's nonappearance, his inexcusable unprepar-
edness to proceed to trial despite pre-trial warnings that exten-
sions would be denied was the dispositive factor in the majority
72 App. Div. 2d at 686, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 351-52 (Fein, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 686, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 351 (Fein, J., dissenting). See note 17 infra.
72 App. Div. 2d at 686, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 351-52 (Fein, J., dissenting). See note 21
infra. The dissent also noted that allowing the second action would not prejudice the defen-
dant who had waited more than 5 years before moving to dismiss the second complaint. Id.
at 686, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 352 (Fein, J., dissenting).
7 One commentator has framed the issue as "whether there was a willful and deliber-
ate refusal to proceed which amounted to a neglect to prosecute." 1 WK&M 1 205.06 at 2-
142 & n.31 (1977). Similarly, Dean McLaughlin has stated that where "there is no pattern of
dilatory tactics, and no contumacious refusals to proceed with the litigation, the dismissal
will probably not amount to neglect to prosecute." CPLR 205, commentary at 197 (McKin-
ney 1972). Thus, where the 6-month extension has been denied for failure to answer a calen-
dar call, the plaintiff's non-appearance has been "coupled with ... protracted and repeated
delays," Flans v. Federal Ins. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 881, 882, 374 N.E.2d 365, 365, 403 N.Y.S.2d
466, 467 (1978), rev'g, 56 App. Div. 2d 615, 391 N.Y.S.2d 659 (2d Dep't 1977), or is part of a
"repeated and deliberate failure to proceed to trial." Wright v. L.C. Defelice & Son, Inc., 22
App. Div. 2d 962, 963, 256 N.Y.S.2d 63, 65 (2d Dep't 1964), af'd, 17 N.Y.S.2d 586, 215
N.E.2d 522, 268 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1966). Cf. Virgilio v. Ketchum, 54 Misc. 2d 111, 113, 281
N.Y.S.2d 376, 378 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1967) (extension granted to plaintiff who failed
to serve complaint since there was "no pattern of dilatoriness or refusal to proceed").
11 See Cordova v. City of New York, 57 Misc. 2d 823, 826, 293 N.Y.S.2d 673, 675 (Sup.
Ct. Bronx County 1968). In Gaines v. City of New York, 215 N.Y. 533, 109 N.E. 594 (1915),
Judge Cardozo examined the origins of CPLR 205(a) and its predecessors, concluding that:
The statute is designed to insure to the diligent suitor the right to a hearing in
court till he reaches a judgment on the merits. Its broad and liberal purpose is not
to be frittered away by any narrow construction. The important consideration, is
that by invoking judicial aid, a litigant gives timely notice to his adversary of a
present purpose to maintain his rights before the courts.
Id. at 539, 109 N.E. at 596; see 1 WK&M T 205.01 at 2-131 to 132 (1977); The Quarterly
Survey, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 532, 539 (1970).
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holding.' Moreover, it is submitted that no other interpretation of
9 It appears that two factors present in Laffey also have influenced the resolution of
several recent cases. First is the nonappearance of plaintiffs on scheduled dates "with no
attempt being made to excuse such failure." Flans v. Federal Ins. Co., 56 App. Div. 2d 615,
618, 391 N.Y.S.2d 659, 663 (2d Dep't 1977) (Martuscello, J., dissenting), rev'd, 43 N.Y.2d
881, 374 N.E.2d 365, 403 N.Y.S.2d 466 (1978); see Laffey v. City of New York, 72 App. Div.
2d 685, 685, 421 N.Y.S.2d 350, 350 (1st Dep't 1979). Thus, a dismissal for the inexcusable
unpreparedness of the plaintiff to proceed to trial has been held to constitute neglect to
prosecute and a bar to the reinstituted action, see Hymowitz v. Soprinsky, 24 App. Div. 2d
750, 263 N.Y.S.2d 822 (1st Dep't 1965), while the presence of a mitigating circumstance such
as the unavoidable engagement of counsel in another case has saved the reinstituted action.
See Cordova v. City of New York, 57 Misc. 2d 823, 293 N.Y.S. 2d 673 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County 1968). Cf. Sweeting v. Staten Island Midland Ry., 176 App. Div. 494, 162 N.Y.S. 961
(2d Dep't 1917) (per curiam) (failure to answer calendar call held mistake or inadvertence
and not neglect to prosecute).
A second factor present in the recent cases is that the plaintiffs have been fully aware of
and have agreed to the possibility of dismissal for failure to prosecute. While this circum-
-stance has been discussed as an element constituting a voluntary discontinuance, it also has
been found to constitute neglect to prosecute. Flans v. Federal Ins. Co., 56 App. Div. 2d 615,
618, 391 N.Y.S.2d 659, 662-63 (2d Dep't 1977) (Martuscello, J., dissenting), rev'd, 43 N.Y.2d
881, 374 N.E.2d 365, 403 N.Y.S.2d 466 (1978). This is understandable in that a forewarning
to the plaintiff naturally would tend to color his subsequent failure to appear as "willful"
and "deliberate." See Wright v. L.C. Defelice & Son, Inc., 22 App. Div. 2d 962, 963, 256
N.Y.S.2d 63, 65 (2d Dep't 1964), aff'd, 17 N.Y.2d 586, 215 N.E.2d 522, 268 N.Y.S.2d 345
(19S6).
In Flans, for example, the plaintiffs had timely commenced an action to recover for
property damage allegedly covered by their homeowner's insurance policy. 56 App. Div. 2d
at 615, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 659-60. Both parties had agreed to a stipulation which required the
plaintiffs' appearance at a pre-trial examination and warned of the threat of dismissal for
failing to be prepared on the date of the trial. Thereafter, the plaintiffs and their counsel
failed to appear at the examination and the plaintiffs also failed to appear for trial because
they had moved to Israel. The trial court dismissed the suit and the plaintiffs recommenced
the action even though the statute of limitations had expired. Id. at 616, 391 N.Y.S.2d at
660-61 (Martuscello, J., dissenting). The majority in the appellate division held that the
plaintiffs were entitled to recommence the action since the defendant had notice of the
plaintiffs claim within the period provided in the insurance policy. 56 App. Div. 2d at 615,
391 N.Y.S.2d at 660. Justice Martuscello, dissenting with Justice Latham, opined that the
dismissal was for both a voluntary discontinuance and a neglect to prosecute. Id. at 618, 391
N.Y.S.2d at 663 (Martuscello, J., dissenting). The dissent felt that the plaintiffs' conduct
amounted to "far more than a routine failure to answer a calendar call. . . . It was a delib-
erate and unabashed refusal to prosecute the action. . . ." Id. at .618, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 663
(Martuscello, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). According to Justice Martuscello:
It is playing with the court's processes to permit plaintiffs to ignore their clear
promises to the court that by March 17, 1975 the deposition would be held; that
by March 24, 1975 the trial would commence; and that if the examination were
not held or if the parties were not prepared to go to trial on the date stipulated,
the action would be dismissed. Plaintiffs should be held to their promises.
56 App. Div. 2d at 618, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
The Court of Appeals reversed the majority of the appellate division finding that the
prior dismissal was "inferentially for 'neglect to prosecute.'" 43 N.Y.2d 881, 374 N.E.2d 365,
403 N.Y.S.2d 466.
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Laffey can be reconciled with precedent and it is unlikely that the
majority would institute such a fundamental shift in policy in a
memorandum decision.
The Laffey decision, nonetheless, reflects the contemporary re-
luctance of the courts to allow extensions of the statute of limita-
tions in questionable cases.20 The trial bar should be alert to this
trend and when confronted with a dismissal should seek to have
the record indicate whether it is with or without prejudice for pur-
poses of recommencing the action. Specifying that the dismissal is
without prejudice will insure a plaintiff's right to recommence an
action under CPLR 205(a), since the intent of the trial court at the
time of dismissal is all but dispositive of this issue.2' If the dismis-
sal is with prejudice, the preferable strategy would be to seek to
vacate the dismissal and appeal directly any adverse ruling rather
than perfunctorily attempting to invoke the 6-month extension.22
Stephen H. Perry
20 Commentators have long noted a conservative trend in allowing the 6-month exten-
sion through a broadening of the neglect to prosecute exception. See McLaughlin, Survey of
New York Law - Civil Practice, 18 SYRACUSE L. REV. 407, 415-16 (1966); McLaughlin, Sur-
vey of New York Law - Civil Practice, 17 SYRACUSE L. REV. 331, 340-41 (1965); The Bian-
nual Survey, 40 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 120, 127 (1965). Compare Wright v. L.C. Defelice & Son,
Inc., 22 App. Div. 2d 962, 256 N.Y.S.2d 63 (2d Dep't 1964), aff'd, 17 N.Y.2d 586, 215 N.E.2d
522, 268 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1966) and Jelinek v. City of New York, 25 App. Div. 2d 425, 266
N.Y.S.2d 766 (1st Dep't 1966) with Schneck v. S.T. Grand, Inc., 11 Misc. 2d 923, 174
N.Y.S.2d 749 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1958).
The Laffey decision appears to surface at the forefront of this trend in finding neglect
to prosecute from a single instance of inexcusable delay while prior cases concerned repeti-
tive patterns of delay. See note 17 supra. The attitude of the courts may be explained by a
heightened concern for expeditious administration in an age of calendar congestion and trial
delay. See Wright v. L.C. Defelice & Son, Inc., 22 App. Div. 2d 962, 963, 256 N.Y.S.2d 63, 65
(2d Dep't 1964), aff'd, 17 N.Y.2d 586, 215 N.E.2d 522, 268 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1966); McLaughlin,
Survey of New York Law-Civil Practice, 17 SYRACUSE L. REV. 331, 341 (1965).
21 A critical factor in finding neglect to prosecute is the intention of the trial judge
granting the dismissal motion. See Schuman v. Hertz Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 604, 215 N.E.2d 683,
268 N.Y.S.2d 563 (1966); SIEGEL § 376 at 484. Consequently, a dismissal which expressly
states that it is without prejudice would seem to preserve a plaintiff's right to recommence
an action. See Izquierdo v. Cities Servs. Oil Co., 47 Misc. 2d 1087, 264 N.Y.S.2d 58 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1965). A dismissal without prejudice nevertheless, may be challenged as an
abuse of discretion by a defendant. See CPLR 205, commentary at 198 (McKinney 1972).
See also Litwin v. Grand Central Apartments, Inc., 37 Misc. 2d 115, 234 N.Y.S.2d 73 (Sup.
Ct. Queens County 1962). The record is reviewable in a new action instituted under CPLR
205(a) in order to determine the intent of the trial judge in dismissing the prior suit. See
Schuman v. Hertz Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 604, 215 N.E.2d 683, 268 N.Y.S.2d 563 (1966), rev'g, 23
App. Div. 2d 646, 257 N.Y.S.2d 400 (1st Dep't 1965).
212 See Hymowitz v. Soprinsky, 24 App. Div. 2d 750, 263 N.Y.S.2d 822 (1st Dep't 1965);
McLaughlin, Survey of New York Law - Civil Practice, 18 SYRACUSE L. REV. 407, 416
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ARTICLE 3-JURISDICTION AND SERVICE, APPEARANCE AND CHOICE
OF COURT
CPLR 308(4): Affixing summons to defendant's former residence
ineffective to confer jurisdiction notwithstanding plaintiff's rea-
sonable mistake nor defendant's receipt of process
CPLR 308(4)23 permits service of process by "affixing the sum-
mons to the door of either the [defendant's] actual place of busi-
ness, dwelling place or usual place of abode" and mailing it to his
"last known residence" when service by delivery 24 cannot be ac-
(1966). Failure to challenge an order of dismissal by direct appeal in the original action may
itself be a contributing factor to a finding of neglect to prosecute. See Flans v. Federal Ins.
Co., 56 App. Div. 2d 615, 618, 391 N.Y.S.2d 659, 662 (2d Dep't 1977) (Martuscello, J., dis-
senting), rev'd, 43 N.Y.2d 881, 374 N.E.2d 365, 403 N.Y.S.2d 466 (1978); Hymowitz v.
Soprinsky, 24 App. Div. 2d 750, 263 N.Y.S.2d 822 (1st Dep't 1965). Confronted with such a
judicial sentiment, it is submitted that the most effective review of the merits of a dismissal
order is upon direct appeal.
23 CPLR 308(4) (Supp. 1979-1980). CPLR 308 provides for service of process upon a
natural person by the following methods:
1. by delivering the summons within the state to the person to be served; or
2. by delivering the summons within the state to a person of suitable age
and discretion at the actual place of business, dwelling place or usual place of
abode of the person to be served and by mailing the summons to the person to be
served at his last known residence; ... or
4. where service under paragraphs one and two cannot be made with due
diligence, by affixing the summons to the door of either the actual place of busi-
ness, dwelling place or usual place of abode within the state of the person to be
served and by mailing the summons to such person at his last known residence;
... or
5. [i]n such manner as the court, upon motion without notice, directs, if ser-
vice is impracticable under paragraphs one, two and four of this section.
2 Under CPLR 308, alternative and independent methods of service by delivery are
available. See CPLR 308(1), (2) (1972); note 23 supra. Personal delivery is one method.
"Deliver and mail" service, as an alternative to personal delivery, is of recent origin. Under
the Civil Practice Act, service other than by personal delivery, so-called "substituted ser-
vice," was obtainable only by court order. CPLR 308 as originally enacted permitted "de-
liver and mail" or "nail and mail" service without a court order, but only if personal deliv-
ery could not have been made with "due diligence." See CPLR 308, ch. 308, § 308
[1962]N.Y. LAWS 1316 (current version at CPLR 308(2) & 308(4) (1972)); SIXTEENTH ANN.
REP. OF THE N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE A38 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SIXTEENTH ANN. REP.];
SIEGEL § 71. The excessive hardships imposed to process servers attempting to comply with
the statute led to an abuse known as "sewer service," the fraudulent practice of serving
process in an unauthorized manner and then executing false affidavits of service. SIXTEENTH
ANN. REP., supra, at A38; see Note, Abuse of Process: Sewer Service, 3 COLUM. J. L. Soc.
PROB. 17, 22 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Sewer Service]; Comment, Sewer Service and Con-
fessed Judgments: New Protection for Low-Income Consumers, 6 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS - CIv.
LIB. L. REv. 414, 422 (1971) [hereinafter cited as New Protection].
In an attempt to ease the problem, the service requirements of CPLR 308 were liberal-
